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Abstract
The existing theory of decoy-state quantum cryptography assumes the exact control of each
states from Alice’s source. Such exact control is impossible in practice. We develop the theory
of decoy-state method so that it is unconditionally secure even there are state errors of sources,
if the range of a few parameters in the states are known. This theory simplifies the practical
implementation of the decoy-state quantum key distribution because the unconditional security
can be achieved with a slightly shortened final key, even though the small errors of pulses are not
corrected.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the existing set-ups of quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2, 3, 4, 5] use imperfect
single-photon source. Such an implementation in principle suffers from the photon-number-
splitting attack [6, 7]. The decoy-state method [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] and some other methods
[16, 17, 18] can be used for unconditionally secure QKD even Alice only uses an imperfect
source[6, 7].
The separate theoretical result of ILM-GLLP [5] shows that a secure final key can be
distilled even though an imperfect source is used in the protocol, if one knows the lower
bound of the fraction of those raw bits generated by single-photon pulses from Alice. The
decoy-state method is to verify such a bound faithfully and efficiently. The ILM-GLLP
theory does not need the exact value of the fraction of raw bits due to single-photon pulses
from Alice. It only needs the lower bound of fraction of un-tagged bits. The goal of decoy-
state method is to verify such a lower bound through the observed experiment data.
Recently, a number of experiments on the decoy-state QKD have been done [19, 20].
However, the existing decoy-state theory assumes the perfect control of the source states
in the photon number space. This is an impossible task for any real set-up in practice.
A new problem arose in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method securely and
efficiently given the inexact control of the source. Even though one can control the pulse
intensity pretty well in practice, we still need quantitative criteria on the effects of possible
small errors in the source states. By currently existing technology, the source error can be
polynomially small rather than exponentially small. One may argue sine the source error is
very small, the error-free decoy-state theory must work. But we never know how small is
sufficiently small so that the error can be securely regarded as 0. If we judge 20% of intensity
error is too large, we have no reason to say 1% error is small enough for unconditional security
with error-free decoy-state theory. There are also problems in evaluating the different set-
ups. Suppose there are two set-ups, A and B, they can make QKD for the same distance.
Set-up A can have a key rate of 100 bits per second with possible intensity error of 3%
while set-up B can have a key rate of 80 bits per second with possible intensity error of 1%,
we don’t know which one is better. To answer all these questions, we need a more general
theory that directly applies to the case with state errors. If we have a stable two-value
attenuator, we can use the method in Ref.[23]. If the parameter errors of states of each
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pulses are random and independent, we can apply the existing decoy-state method with the
averaged-state[12, 22].
Here we study the decoy-state method with state errors of Alice’s source without any
of the above presumed conditions. Our result here is not limited to the intensity error
only, it applies to the more general case of state errors from the source. For example,
in the protocol using coherent states, intensity error is only a special type of error which
changes one parameter in the coherent state only, but the state is still a coherent state,
i.e., a Possonian distribution with another parameter. Generally speaking, there could be
certain types of sour errors with which the state is not a coherent state, i.e., not in the
Possonian distribution. Our study shows that the decoy-state method is still secure even
with state errors, but the key rate will be decreased. Our result only needs the range of a
few parameters in the source states, regardless of whatever error pattern. In our method,
we have assumed the worst case that Eavesdropper (Eve.) knows exactly the error of each
pulse. Our result immediately applies to all existing experimental results.
This paper is arranged as the following. After the introduction above, we review the
main idea and basic assumptions of the existing error-free decoy-state theory. As a result,
the most general condition and formula for the error-free decoy-state method are given. We
then study the main problem of this paper: the decoy-state method with state errors from
the source. After pointing out the consequence of the source errors, we present a general
formula where only the bound values of a few parameters in the states are involved. The
result is secure even in the case Eve. knows exactly the error of each pulse. We then point
out that our theory can be applied in the practical set-ups with state errors, such as the
decoy-state Plug-and-Play protocol raised by Gisin group[25]. The paper is ended with a
concluding remark.
II. REVIEW OF THE EXISTING ERROR-FREE DECOY-STATE THEORY
We call the existing theory[8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15] error-free theory because it assumes no
error for the source states in the photon-number space. Although most of the literatures[8,
9, 10, 11] study the error-free decoy-state method only with specific distributions of source
states, the assumption of a specific distribution is actually not necessary. Basically, we only
need a few conditions for the source states rather than the complete distribution function.
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Here we summarize the existing theory in the extended format.
In the 3-intensity protocol, Alice has three sources, source Y0 which can produce vacuum
only, source Y which can only produce state
ρ =
J∑
k=0
ak|k〉〈k| (1)
only, and source Y ′ which can only produce state
ρ′ =
J∑
k=0
a′k|k〉〈k| (2)
only, where |k〉 is the k−photon Fock state and ak ≥ 0, a
′
k ≥ 0 for all k,
∑
ak =
∑
a′k =
1. Here J can be either finite or infinite. Given a coherent-state source or a heralded
single-photon source from the parametric down conversion, J =∞. When a coherent-state
source[8, 9, 10, 11] or a heralded single-photon source[13, 14] is used, the parameters ak, a
′
k
are determined by the intensity (averaged photon number) of a pulse.
For simplicity, we shall also call source Y0, Y, Y
′ the vacuum source, the decoy source,
and the signal source, respectively. Pulses from the decoy source or the signal source are
called the decoy pulses or the signal pulses, respectively. In the protocol, Alice may use each
source of {Y0, Y, Y
′} randomly with probabilities p0, p, p
′ (p0+p+p
′ = 1) whenever she sends
out a pulse to Bob. Given the states in Eqs.(1,2), we can equivalently regard that source
Y or Y ′ as a probabilistic photon-number source which sends out a k-photon pulse (photon
number state |k〉) with probability distribution {ak} or {a
′
k}. The task here is to verify the
lower bound of the raw bits caused by those single-photon pulses from Alice. Alice and
Bob can not directly observe the number of single-photon counts because they don’t know
which pulses at Alice’s side are single-photon pulses. They only know which pulse belongs
to which source and the states of each source. The decoy-state theory shows that they only
need to know the number of counts due to the pulses from each sources in order to verify
how many raw bits are generated from the single-photon pulses from Alice.
We first define the counting rate of a class (or a sub-class) of pulses. A class or a sub-
class can be any set or subset of pulses from Alice. In the 3-intensity decoy-state method,
Alice has 3 sources. Here we shall regard each source as a class, and all those k-photon
(k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·) pulses from the same source as a subclass. Given any class X that contains
MX pulses, after Alice sends them out to Bob, if Bob observes n counts at his side, the
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counting rate for pulses in this class is
Sx = n/MX . (3)
If class X is divided into J sub-classes and any pulse in class X belongs to and only belongs
to one subclass and the fractions of pulses in each subclasses are b0, b1 · · · , bJ , then the
counting rate of class X is
SX =
J∑
k=0
bksk (4)
and sk is the counting rate of the kth subclass. This is simply because the total counts of a
class equals to the summation of counts of each sub-classes, i.e.,
n =
J∑
k=0
nk (5)
and nk is the number of counts at Bob’s side caused by pulses in the kth sub-class from
Alice. We denote the counting rates of the decoy-source (class Y ), the signal source (class
Y ′), and the vacuum source (class Y0) by S, S
′, and S0, respectively. Since in the protocol,
Alice knows which pulse is from which source, these S, S ′, and S0 can be observed directly
in the experiment therefore we regard them as known parameters. Given the state of the
decoy pulses in Eq.(1), the fraction of k−photon pulses is ak. Then we have
S =
J∑
k=0
aksk = a0S0 + a1s1 + λ (6)
and sk is the counting rate of those k−photon pulses from source Y , and
λ =
J∑
k=2
aksk. (7)
Similarly, we also have
S ′ =
J∑
k=0
a′ks
′
k (8)
and s′k is the counting rate of those k−photon pulses from source Y
′, S ′ is the counting rate
of all pulses from source Y ′.
Asymptotically, the counting rate of the sub-class of those k-photon pulses from the decoy
source and the sub-class of those k-photon pulses from the signal source must be equal
sk = s
′
k (9)
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if the pulses from these two subclasses are randomly mixed. According to this, we also have,
s0 = s
′
0 = S0, (10)
Here S0 is the counting rate of class Y0. In the protocol Alice randomly uses three sources
therefore those k-photon pulses from the decoy-source and those k-photon pulses from the
signal source are randomly mixed. We can rewrite Eq.(8) in the format
S ′ =
J∑
k=0
a′ksk = a
′
0s0 + a
′
1s1 +
a′2
a2
λ+ δ (11)
and
δ =
J∑
k=2
a′ksk −
a′2
a2
λ. (12)
Obviously,
δ ≥ 0 (13)
if
a′k
ak
≥
a′2
a2
≥
a′1
a1
. (14)
Given Eq.(6,11), one can find the following fact
s1 = s
′
1 =
a′2(S − a0s0)− a2(S
′ − a′0s0)
a′2a1 − a
′
1a2
+
a2δ
a′2a1 − a
′
1a2
. (15)
Since δ ≥ 0, and the second inequality in Eq.(14) is
a′2a1 − a
′
1a2 ≥ 0, (16)
therefore a2δ
a′
2
a1−a′1a2
≥ 0. The minimum value of the single-photon counting rate is now
verified to be
s1 = s
′
1 ≥
a′2(S − a0s0)− a2(S
′ − a′0s0)
a′2a1 − a
′
1a2
. (17)
The fractions of the single-photon counts for the signal source and the decoy source are
therefore
∆′1 =
a′1s1
S ′
, ∆1 =
a1s1
S
. (18)
Given these, one can calculate the final key rate of each source, e.g., the final key rate for
the signal source is by[5, 11]
Rs = ∆
′
1[1−H(t1)]−H(t) (19)
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where t1, t are the QBER for single-photon pulses and the QBER for all signal pulses. This
is the (extended) result of the decoy-state method with diagonal states in photon number
space, including the coherent states, thermal states, heralded single-photon states, and so
on with the condition that the source states are exactly controlled and Eq.(14) holds.
III. CONSEQUENCE OF SOURCE ERRORS: sk 6= s
′
k
However, the results above are based on the assumption that all states are produced
exactly. Now we study the the consequence of the source errors in an actual protocol.
A very tricky point here is that Eq.(9) is in general incorrect, if there are state errors. We
emphasize that this issue was first pointed out by us in a number of places. For example, in
the shorter version of our work [24] (in the text around Eq.(11) there), and also in section
4.3.5 of Ref.[8]. In all these places we have clearly stated the issue. Here we present the
main idea about this point and also the reason behind:
Eq.(9) is the most important element of the error-free decoy-state theory. Now we explain
why we don’t use Eq.(9) here if we assume Eve. knows the state errors.
For simplicity, we consider the following two-block collective errors with coherent states:
Alice wants to use intensity µ = 0.2 for decoy pulses and intensity µ′ = 0.6 for signal pulses.
However, in some blocks (strengthened blocks), both decoy pulses and signal pulses are
10% stronger than the assumed intensity, in the other blocks (weakened blocks), both decoy
pulses and signal pulses are 10% weaker than the assumed values[8]. Suppose Alice always
with probabilities of p0, p, p
′ to choose one of three different sources (the vacuum source, the
decoy source, and the signal source source). The density operator of a coherent state with
intensity x is
ρx = e
−x
∞∑
k=0
xk
k!
|k〉〈k|. (20)
Here is Eve’s scheme using time-dependent channel: she blocks all pulses from the
weakened blocks, and she produces a linear channel of transmittance 2ηe to attenuate each
pulse from the strengthened block. Straightly, the actual counting rate of those single-photon
pulses from the decoy source is
s1 =
1
2
× 2ηe × 1.1µe
−1.1µ
(0.9µe−0.9µ + 1.1µe−1.1µ)/2
(21)
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and the actual counting rate of those single-photon pulses from signal source is
s′1 =
1
2
× 2ηe × 1.1µ
′e−1.1µ
′
(0.9µ′e−0.9µ′ + 1.1µ′e−1.1µ′)/2
. (22)
We find
s1/s
′
1 =
e0.2µ
′
+ 1.1/0.9
e0.2µ + 1.1/0.9
6= 1. (23)
Similarly, we can also show that sk 6= s
′
k for any k. This shows, given the collective error
which is known to Eve, Eve can treat the identical k−photon pulses differently according to
which source the are from !
The reason behind the above result is because the collective errors may break the “random
mixture” condition of Eq.(9). Consider again the specific example above. Consider those
single-photon pulses only. In a strengthened block, a single-photon pulse has probability
Ps =
1.1pµe−1.1µ
1.1pµe−1.1µ + 1.1p′µ′e−1.1µ′
=
1
1 + p
′µ′
pµ
e1.1(µ−µ′)
(24)
to be from the decoy source; and probability
P ′s =
1.1p′µe−1.1µ
′
1.1pµe−1.1µ + 1.1p′µ′e−1.1µ′
=
1
1 + pµ
p′µ′
e1.1(µ′−µ)
(25)
to be from the signal source. In a weakened block, a single-photon pulse has probability
Pw =
1
1 + p
′µ′
pµ
e0.9(µ−µ′)
(26)
that it comes from the decoy source; and probability
P ′w =
1
1 + pµ
p′µ′
e0.9(µ′−µ)
(27)
that it comes from the signal source. These values show that the single-photon pulses in the
weakened blocks are more probably from the decoy source than those single-photon pulses
in the strengthened blocks. Also, the single-photon pulses in the weakened blocks are less
probably from the signal source than those single-photon pulses in the strengthened blocks.
These patterns have surely broken the random mixture presumption of Eq.(9).
One may question how Eve. can know the state errors. In the decoy-state plug-and-
play protocol[25], Eve. can actually prepare the error pattern, including the above specific
pattern. (Suppose Alice only wants to monitor each pulse but she does not want to cost too
much to correct the the error of each individual pulse.)
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Even in the one-way protocol, Eve. can also know the intensity errors if Alice does not
want to cost too much to correct each individual pulse. Indeed, in the practical set-ups,
the intensity fluctuation appears collectively to blocks of pulses. Eve. can know the error
patterns by studying the averaged photon number block by block.
In principle, Alice might be able to correct the error of each individual pulses in a real
set-up. But, with the theoretical result of this work, Alice does not have to do so. She only
needs to know the range of a few parameters of the source.
IV. DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH STATE ERRORS
We still assume that each pulse sent out by Alice is randomly chosen from one of 3 sources
Y0, Y, Y
′ with probability p0, p, p
′, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that every pulse
in class Y0 is exactly in vacuum state. But each single-shot of pulses in classes Y (the decoy
source), and Y ′ (the signal source) can be in a state slightly different from the expected one.
Eq.(5) still holds even though there are source errors, because it is simply the definition of
summation. Also, we shall still use Eq.(3) for the definition of counting rate of a certain class
which contains many pulses. Suppose Alice sends M pulses to Bob in the whole protocol.
A. Virtual protocol
For clarity, we first consider a virtual protocol,
Protocol 1: At any time i, each source produces a pulse. The states of the pulses from
sources Y0, Y , Y
′ are |0〉〈0|,
ρi =
J∑
k=0
aki|k〉〈k| ; and (28)
ρ′i =
J∑
k=0
a′ki|k〉〈k|. (29)
Here ρi, and ρ
′
i can be a bit different from ρ and ρ
′ of Eq.(1, 2), which are the assumed
states in the perfect protocol where there is on source error. At any time i, only one pulse
is selected and sent out for Bob, and the probability for a pulse to be selected and sent
out is constantly p0, p, and p
′ if the pulse is from vacuum source (decoy-source or signal
source). The un-selected two pulses at each time will be blocked and absorbed. After Bob
9
has completed all measurements to the incident pulses, Alice checks the record about which
pulse is selected at each time, i.e., which time has used which source.
As shown below, based on this virtual protocol, we can formulate the number of counts
from each source and therefore find the lower bound of the number of single-photon counts.
The result also holds for the real protocol where Alice decides to use which sources at the
ith time in the beginning with the same probability distribution p0, p and p
′. In this case,
at each time i, only one source emits a pulse.
B. Our goal
Our goal is to find the lower bound of the fraction of counts caused by those single-photon
pulses for both the signal source and the decoy source. The following quantities are directly
observed in the protocol therefore we regard them as known parameters: Nd, the number of
counts caused by the decoy source, and Ns, the number of counts caused by the signal source,
and N0, the number of counts caused by the vacuum source, Y0. Obviously, S =
Nd
pM
, the
counting rate of the decoy source, and Ns =
Ns
p′M
, the counting rate of the signal source, and
S0 =
N0
p0M
, the counting rate of the vacuum source, are also known exactly in the protocol.
Clearly, here pM , p′M and p0M are just the number of the decoy pulses, the number of the
signal pulses, and the number of pulses from the vacuum source, respectively. Therefore,
for our goal, we only need to formulate the number of counts caused by those single-photon
pulses from each sources in terms of these quantities and p0, p, p
′ and the bound values of
those parameters aki, a
′
ki as appear in Eq.(28,29).
C. Some definitions
Definition 1. In the protocol, Alice sends Bob M pulses, one by one. In response to
Alice, Bob observes his detector for M times. As Bob’s ith observed result, Bob’s detector
can either click or not click. If the detector clicks in Bob’s ith observation, then we say that
“the ith pulse from Alice has caused a count”. We disregard how the ith pulse may change
after it is sent out. When we say that Alice’s ith pulse has caused a count we only need
Bob’s detector clicks in Bob’s ith observation.
Given the source state in Eqs.(28,29), any ith pulse sent out by Alice must be in a photon-
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number state. To anyone outside Alice’s lab, it looks as if that Alice only sends a photon
number state at each single-shot: sometimes it’s vacuum, sometimes it’s a single-photon
pulse, sometimes it is a k−photon pulses, and so on. We shall make use of this fact that
any individual pulse is in one Fock state.
Definition 2, set C and ck: Set C contains any B-pulse that has caused a count; set ck
contains any k−photon B-pulse that has caused a count. Mathematically speaking, the
sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ C is that the ith pulse has caused a count. The
sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ ck is that the ith pulse contains k photons and it
has caused a count. For instance, if the photon number states of the first 10 pulses from
Alice are |0〉, |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |0〉, |1〉, |3〉, |2〉, |1〉, |0〉, and the pulses of i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10
each has caused a count at Bob’s side, then we have
C = {i|i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, · · ·}; c0 = {i|i = 2, 5, 10, · · ·}; c1 = {i|i = 3, 6, 9, · · ·}. (30)
Clearly, C = c0 ∪ c1 ∪ c2 · · ·, every pulse in set C has caused a count.
Definition 3. For any k ≥ 0, for the parameters in Eqs.(28, 29), we denote aLk and a
U
k the
minimum value and maximum value of {aki| i = 1, 2, · · ·M}; a
′L
k and a
′U
k the minimum value
and maximum value of {a′ki| i = 1, 2, · · · ,M}. We assume these bound values are known in
the protocol.
D. Number of vacuum counts
Here we shall give the explicit formulas to bound n0d, the number of counts caused by
those vacuum pulses from the decoy source, and n′0s, the number of counts caused by those
vacuum pulses from the signal source. We want to formulate them by the known quantities,
such as N0, the number of counts by the vacuum source (source Y0), or S0, the counting rate
of the vacuum source.
Given the definition of the set ck, the number of counts caused by all vacuum pulses is
just the number of pulses in set c0. We want to know how many of the vacuum counts are
caused by each source. This is equivalent to ask how many of pules in set c0 come from each
source. A vacuum pulse can come from any of the 3 sources, the vacuum source (Y0), the
decoy source (Y ) and the signal source (Y ′). According to Eqs.(28, 29), if the ith pulse is
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vacuum, the probability that it comes from the vacuum source (Y0) is
Pvi|0 =
p0
p0 + pa0i + p′a′0i
.
Asymptotically, in set c0, the population of pulses from source Y0 is
∑
i∈c0
Pvi|0.
This is also the number of counts caused by source Y0, since every pulse in c0 has caused a
count. Therefore the observed number of counts caused by source Y0 must satisfy
N0 =
∑
i∈c0
p0d0i (31)
Here
d0i =
1
p0 + pa0i + p′a
′
0i
. (32)
Similarly, if the ith pulse contains 0 photon, it has a probability Pdi|0 =
pa0i
p0+pa0i+p′a′0i
to be
from the decoy source, and a probability of Psi|0 =
p′a′
0i
p0+pa0i+p′a′0i
to be from the signal source.
Therefore we have
n0d =
∑
i∈c0
Pdi|0 =
∑
i∈c0
pa0id0i, (33)
for the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the decoy source, and
n′0s =
∑
i∈c0
Psi|0 =
∑
i∈c0
p′a′0id0i, (34)
for the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the signal source. Therefore,
with our Definition 3, n0d, n
′
0s are bounded by
nU0d = pa
U
0
∑
i∈c0
d0i ≥ n0d ≥ pa
L
0
∑
i∈c0
d0i = n
L
0d (35)
and
n′U0s = p
′a′U0
∑
i∈c0
d0i ≥ n0d ≥ p
′a′L0
∑
i∈c0
d0i = n
′L
0s. (36)
Using the fact
∑
i∈c0
d0i =
N0
p0
from Eq.(31), we replace the above two equations by
nU0d =
paU0 N0
p0
≥ n0d ≥
paL0N0
p0
= nL0d
n′U0s =
p′a′U0 N0
p0
≥ n′0s ≥
p′a′L0 N0
p0
= n′L0s (37)
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By definition, the counting rate of source Y0 is S0 =
N0
p0M
, therefore the above equations are
equivalent to
nU0d = a
U
0 pS0M ≥ n0d ≥ a
L
0 pS0M = n
L
0d
n′U0s = a
′U
0 p
′S0M ≥ n
′
0s ≥ a
′L
0 p
′S0M = n
′L
0s. (38)
E. Calculations and main formulas
According to our definition of set C earlier, every pulse in set C has caused a count.
Therefore, the population of the decoy pulses (signal pulses) in set C is just Nd (or Ns), the
number of counts of the decoy source (signal source). Asymptotically,
Nd =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Pdi|k = n0d +
∑
i∈c1
Pdi|1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
Pdi|k (39)
Ns =
J∑
k=0
∑
i∈ck
Psi|k = n
′
0s +
∑
i∈c1
Psi|1 +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
Psi|k (40)
and Pdi|k (or Psi|k )is the probability that the ith pulse comes from the decoy source (or
signal source); if the ith pulse contains k photons. Here we have used Eqs.(33, 34).
Consider those k-photon pulses (k ≥ 1). A k-photon pulse can come from either the
decoy source or the signal source.
Fact : Define
dki =
1
paki + p′a′ki
, for k ≥ 1, (41)
if the ith pulse contains k photons, it has a probability pakidki to be from the decoy source
(source Y ), and a probability p′a′kidki to be from the signal source (source Y
′), if k ≥ 1.
This is to say, Pdi|k in Eq.(39) and Psi|k in Eq.(40)are given by
Pdi|k = pakidki (42)
and
Psi|k = p
′a′kidki (43)
Therefore, Eqs.(39, 40) can be re-written in the following equivalent form
Nd = n0d + p
∑
i∈c1
a1id1i + p
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
akidki, (44)
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Ns = n
′
0s + p
′
∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i + p
′
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
a′kid1i. (45)
Our goal as stated in the subsection IVB is simply to know the minimum value of
D1 =
∑
i∈c1
d1i. (46)
For, with this and Definition 3, the minimum value of the number of counts caused by
single-photon pulses from the signal-source (or the decoy-source) is simply
n′L1s = p
′a′L1 D1 ≤ n
′
1s, (or n
L
1d = pa
L
1D1 ≤ n1d). (47)
In what follows we shall find the formula of D1 in terms of Nd, Ns, n0d, n
′
0s based on Eqs.(44,
45). [n0d, n
′
0s have been given in Eq(37)]. Eqs.(44, 45) can be written in
Nd = n0d + pa
U
1 D1 + pΛ− ξ1 (48)
Ns = n
′
0s + p
′a′L1 D1 + p
′Λ′ + ξ2 (49)
where
Λ =
J∑
k=2
aUk
∑
i∈ck
dki; Λ
′ =
J∑
k=2
a′Lk
∑
i∈ck
dki, (50)
and
ξ1 = p
[
aU1 D1 + Λ−
(∑
i∈c1
a1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
akidki
)]
≥ 0
ξ2 = p
′
[∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i +
J∑
k=2
∑
i∈ck
a′kidki −
(
a′L1 D1 + Λ
′
)]
≥ 0
According to the definition of Λ and Λ′, we also have
Λ′ =
a′L2
aU2
Λ + ξ3 (51)
and
ξ3 = Λ
′ −
a′L2
aU2
Λ (52)
Further, we assume the important condition
a′Lk
aUk
≥
a′L2
aU2
≥
a′L1
aU1
, for all k ≥ 2. (53)
The first inequality above leads to
ξ3 ≥ 0 (54)
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as one may easily prove. With Eq.(51), Eq.(49) is equivalent to
Ns = n
′
0s + p
′a′L1 D1 + p
′a
′L
2
aU2
Λ + ξ2 + ξ3 (55)
Given the Eqs.(48, 55), we can formulate D1:
D1 =
a′L2 Nd/p− a
U
2 Ns/p
′ − a′L2 n0d/p+ a
U
2 n
′
0s/p
′ + a′L2 ξ1/p+ a
U
2 (ξ2 + ξ3)/p
′
aU1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2
. (56)
Since ξ1, ξ2, and ξ3 are all non-negative, and a
U
1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 ≥ 0 by the second inequality of
Eq.(53), we now have
D1 ≥
a′L2 Nd/p− a
U
2 Ns/p
′ − a′L2 n0d/p+ a
U
2 n
′
0s/p
′
aU1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2
. (57)
The bound values of n0d, n
′
0d have been given by Eq.(37, 38) in the earlier subsubsection.
Therefore, we can now bound the fraction of single counts among all counts caused by the
signal source
∆′1 ≥
p′a′L1 D1
Ns
≥
a′L1 (a
′L
2 Ndp
′/p− aU2 Ns − p
′a′L2 a
U
0 N0/p0 + a
U
2 a
′L
0 N0p
′/p0)
Ns(aU1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 )
. (58)
According to Eq.(47), p′a′L1 D1 is the lower bound of the number of counts caused by single-
photon pulses from the signal source. Here we have replaced n0d in Eq.(57) by its upper
bound and n′0s by its lower bound as given in Eq.(37). Using Eq.(38), we can write the
right-hand-side of the inequality in terms of counting rates:
∆′1 ≥
a′L1
(
a′L2 S − a
U
2 S
′ − a′L2 a
U
0 S0 + a
U
2 a
′L
0 S0
)
S ′ (aU1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 )
(59)
where S ′ = Ns
p′M
is the counting rate of the signal source, S = Nd
pM
is the counting rate of the
decoy source, and M is the total number of pulses as defined earlier. Similarly, we also have
∆1 ≥
aL1
(
a′L2 S − a
U
2 S
′ − a′L2 a
U
0 S0 + a
U
2 a
′L
0 S0
)
S (aU1 a
′L
2 − a
′L
1 a
U
2 )
(60)
for the minimum value of fraction of single-photon counts for the decoy source.
Eqs.(53, 58, 59) and (60) are our main results of this work. The results are based on the
virtual protocol where Alice checks which source is used at each time after Bob’s detection.
Obviously Alice can choose to check the information before sending out the pulses, i.e., Alice
can decide which source to be used at each time in the very beginning. This is then just the
real protocol of the decoy-state method.
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TABLE I: Secure key rate (R) vs different values of intensity error upper bound (δM ) using the
experimental data in the case of 50 km [20]. The experiment lasts for 1481.2 seconds with the
repetition rate 4 MHz. We have observed S′ = 3.817 × 10−4, S = 1.548 × 10−4, S0 = 2.609 × 10
−5
and the quantum bit error rates (QBER) for signal states and decoy states are 4.247%, 8.379%
respectively. The relative fractions of the signal pulses, decoy pulses and the pulses from the
vacuum source are 0.50269: 0.40726: 0.09006. The final key rate is calculated by Eq.(19) and we
use the formula 4.247%∆′
1
for t1 in Eq.(19).
δM 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0
R (Hz) 70.8 84.3 97.6 110.7 123.6 136.3
For coherent states, if the intensity is bounded by [µL, µU ] for the decoy pulses and
[µ′L, µ′U ] for the signal pulses then
aXk = (µ
X)ke−µ
X
/k!, a′Xk = (µ
′X)ke−µ
′X
/k! (61)
with X = L, U and k = 1, 2 and
aL0 = e
−µU , aU0 = e
−µL a′L0 = e
−µ′U , a′U0 = e
−µ′L (62)
Therefore, one can calculate the final key rate by Eq.(19) now, if the bound values of
intensity errors are known. The asymptotic result using the experimental data of QKD over
50 kilometers calculated by our formula is listed in table I.
V. APPLICATION IN THE PLUG-AND-PLAY PROTOCOL
As shown by Gisin et al[25], combining with the decoy-state method, the plug-and-play
protocol can be unconditionally secure. There, Alice receives strong pulses from Bob and
she needs to guarantee the exact intensity of the pulse sending to Bob. It is not difficult to
check the intensity, but difficult to precisely correct the intensity of each individual pulses.
Our theory here can help to save the difficult single-shot feed-forward intensity control: Alice
monitors each pulses, to reduce the cost of the set-up, she may only do crude corrections
to the pulses, or she may simply discard those pulses whose intensity errors are too large
(e.g., beyond 2%), and then use our theory with the known bound of state errors. In the
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Plug-and-Play protocol, Eve. actually knows the error of each individual pulse hence the
error-free decoy-state theory based on Eq.(9) fails but our theory here works.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARK AND DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we have for the first time shown the unconditional security of decoy-state
method given what-ever error pattern of the source, provided that the parameters in the
diagonal state of the source satisfy Eq.(53) and the bound values of each parameters in the
state is known. Our result also answers clearly the often asked question “What happens
if the state of Laser beam is not exactly in the assumed distribution ?”. Our result can
be directly applied to the Plug-and-Play decoy-state protocol and simplify all the existing
protocols in practical use. Our result here can be extended to the non-asymptotic case
by taking statistical fluctuations into consideration in Eqs.( 39, 40). This will be reported
elsewhere.
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